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Schwenke: The Quasi-Public Corporation and Constitutional Revision--Formula

NOTES
THE QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION- FORMULA FOR URBAN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT IN FLORIDA*
Since the summer of 1965 America has experienced three years of urban
riots and outbreaks that have threatened the political, economic, and social
fabric of the nation. Although spared the devastation of Watts, Detroit, and
Newark,' twenty-four Florida cities were torn by disturbances and destruction
during the same period. 2 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders classed Tampa as a "major disorder," while the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence devoted a special report to the
3
1968 disturbances in Miami.
This developing urban crisis has been subjected to extended analysis
since the initial explosion in Watts in August 1965. 4 It is attributable, in
part, to the marked redistribution of the nation's population that has taken
place over the past twenty years. From 1950 to 1966, approximately 2 million
Negroes, most of them unskilled and semi-literate, moved to the North and
West seeking better employment in the metropolitan areas; even in the
South more than half of the Negro population now lives in cities.5 At the
same time, the white middle class was fleeing from the central cities to the
suburbs in even greater numbers. As a result, present trends indicate that
by 1972 seven major American cities, including Jacksonville, will have Negro
majorites, while the suburbs ringing them will remain largely all-white. 7
Because of redistribution of population within Florida, urban areas, including
the central core districts and the suburbs surrounding them already constitute
a majority of the stat&s population; by 1985 present estimates suggest there
will be at least fifteen urban areas with over 50,000 population.8
*This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Reveiew Apprentice Prize for the best
student note submitted Winter 1969 Term.
1. See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDmS, REPORT (Bantam
ed. 1968) [hereinafter dted as RIoT REPORT].
2. The total was developed from figures in RIOT REPORT, supra note 1, at 158-59 (6
municipalities) and from numerous reports published in the Miami Herald and St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times during the period Aug. 1, 1965 through Dec. 31, 1968.
3. RiOr REPORT, supra note 1, at 113; MIAMI STUDY TEAM ON CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN
MIAMI, FLA. DURING THE WEEK OF Auc. 5, 1968, REPORT (submitted to the Nat'l Comm'n
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Jan. 15, 1969).
4. See, e.g., RIOT REPORT, supra note 1; P.EsmENr's NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN
PROBLEMS, REPORT (1969); GovEnaoR's COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE: IN
CIYr-AN END OR A BEGINNING (1965).
5. RIOT REPORT, supra note 1, at 240-43.
6. Id. at 245-46.
7. Id. at 391. The inclusion of Jacksonville in this list is now in doubt as the consolidation of all of Duval County into Jacksonville, bringing with it a higher concentration
of white residents, occurred after the RIOT REPORT figures were developed.
8. Grove, Metropolitan Planning?, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 60, 71 (1966). See generally
STAFF REPORT TO INTERIM COMMrI EE ON URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
[609]
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Not only the white middle class has been fleeing to the suburbs; industry
too has joined the hegira. Squeezed by a lack of reasonably priced land for
expansion, inadequate traffic patterns and parking facilities, and an onerous
real estate tax burden, business and industry have relocated in the relatively
open expanses of the suburbs. 9
The suburban migration of business, industry, and middle-class families
has seriously undermined the economic foundations of urban centers. Left
behind are core areas often incapable of financially supporting the services
required in a complex metropolitan center. Consequently, many of the
central cities are experiencing deterioration and blight. At the same time,
the exodus has brought the suburbs to the beginning stages of blight and
decay, with industry, housing, and other facilities so hurriedly set up that
there is "no planning and little sense of community." As the President's
Task Force on Suburban Problems recently acknowledged: "The suburbs do
not stand alone. They are an integral part of the great metropolitan areas
where two of three Americans already live. Help to the troubled central
city and the suburb must
move in parallel. Without the improvement of
0'
both, all will suffer."'
One of the most critical aspects of this urban decline is the lack of
adequate housing for the economically disadvantaged. In Florida, in 1960,
the most recent year for which accurate figures are available, there were
an estimated 635,000 people living in either "deteriorating" or "dilapidated"
dwellings." Nationwide, within metropolitan areas, almost one-sixth of all
families 12 - and nearly two-fifths of nonwhite families' 3 - live in housing
classified as "substandard," "deteriorating," or "dilapidated." Yet, housing
improvement alone, even when tied to urban renewal, will not provide the
ideal balanced community development including large-scale land acquisition,
4
site development, industrialization, provision for neighborhood facilities,
and comprehensive metropolitan and transportation planning.
This note focuses upon present efforts at dealing with elements of urban
community development in Florida and examines the emerging concept of
the quasi-public corporation as a format for joinder of the public and
private sectors in an effort to combat the problems of the metropolitan

(1969).
N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1967, at 54, col. 4. See generally

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT

9.

MISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, REPORT

PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL

COM-

(1969).

10. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1968, at 40, col. 1.
11. See 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS OF HOUSING,
pt. 3, at 11-6, table 2 (1963). This figure was developed through statistical calculations using
the figures of 170,367 deteriorating housing units, 73,780 dilapidated housing units, and the
average of 2.6 persons per unit.
12. 2 id. pt. 1, at 1-20, table B-4.
13. Id. at 1-30, table B-14.
14. See Community Development Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§8-201 et seq. (Supp.
1968).

See generally HOUSING

POSITIVE ACTION:

STAFF OF

STATE PROGRAMS IN

THE

NATIONAL

HOUSING &

URBAN

COMMUNITY

COALITION,

DEVELOPMENT

AGENDA

15-16

FOR

(1968);

G. Schermer Associates, MORE THAN SHELTER: SOCIAL NEEDS IN Low- AND MODERATE-INCOME
(Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rep. No. 8, 1968).

HOUSING 41-3, 54
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sprawl. Discussion of the leading quasi-public attempts in this area, New
York's Corporation for Urban Research and Development and Urban Development Corporation, illustrates the potential application of the approach.
Finally, this note indicates constitutional barriers to implementation of this
form in Florida and proposes an amendment to the 1968 Florida Constitution
to circumvent the obstacles.
TRADITIONAL

APPROACHES TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT

While it is not the purpose of this note to examine in depth current
federal and Florida efforts in urban development, some limited analysis is
desirable, especially in light of the inherent incapacity of these programs to
solve the state's current urban demands.
These governmental efforts developed in response to needs that were
unmet by the private sector. The reasons for failure to provide enough new
facilities and to prevent deterioration of existing buildings in slum areas are
not hard to discern. Costs of materials, labor, and financing for construction
or rehabilitation are high throughout the field; rentals cannot yield a rate
of return competitive with that which can be earned by devoting investment
to new building in the suburbs. 15 Moreover, investors demand a higher
return on urban investments because of added risks: vandalism and tenant
neglect increase maintenance costs; high vacancy rates, tenant turnover, and
"rent skips" make the income flow uncertain; and potential buyers' fears of
being locked into an unprofitable investment make resale difficult. Due to
this substantial element of risk, obtaining mortgage financing from conventional lending institutions for investment in slum areas is extremely difficult.
Money for new construction is virtually unobtainable 6 and short-term, purchase money mortgages at high interest rates are usually the only form of
7
financing available to buyers of slum area buildings.'
The inadequacy of the private market in this area has long been recognized. Since the first modest efforts of the Housing Division of the Federal
Public Works Administration's concentrated on clearing slums and provided
housing for low-income families, federal and local governments have initiated
a succession of programs intended to solve developing urban problems.
Regrettably, most state governments, including Florida's have not been active
participants and innovators. Despite these efforts, however, it is becoming
increasingly evident that the public sector alone will be unable, in the foresee-

15.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE AND THE CITY (1967).

See generally Hearings on FinancialInstitutions and the Urban Crisis Before the Subcomm.
on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking - Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 73-82 (1968) (testimony of William Ross); W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MAmtRKs AND PuLC
POLICY (1963); N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1969, at 53, col. 4; id. Feb. 2, 1969, §3, at 1, col. 4.
16. Hearings, supra note 15, at 157-58; C. RAPKIN, THE REAL ESrATE MA=r IN AN
URBAN RENEWAL ARPA 46-58 (N.Y. City Planning Comm'n 1959); G. STEENLEB, THE TENE-

MENT LANDLORD 104-20 (1966). See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at 20, col. 1.
17. C. RAPmLN, supra note 16, at 49-52.
18. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, tit. II, 48 Stat. 200.
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able future, to provide sufficient resources to eliminate the backlog of necessary
improvements, much less to meet increasing needs.
Public Housing
As already noted, public housing or an alternate approach to providing
satisfactory housing to urban inhabitants, forms one of the basic elements
of any community development effort. The advent of public housing can be
traced to early efforts of the Public Works Administration (PWA).19 In
1935, a federal district court ruled that the federal government could not use
eminent domain to acquire property for low-rent housing; 20 the next year
a state court held that a local government could condemn for housing
projects. 21 As a result of these and subsequent state cases, 22 PWA began
encouraging local participation in the housing effort by making available
loans up to seventy per cent and grants up to thirty per cent.23

The major

federal effort in public housing, the United States Housing Act of 1937,24
carried out the same pattern of operation. The federal administrative agency
for the public housing program, the Housing Assistance Administration,
would neither construct nor operate housing projects itself, but assisted
localities in their effort to provide adequate housing.
In order to avail itself of the largess and advisory assistance of the federal
government the locality had to create, pursuant to state enabling legislation,
a local housing authority.2 5 Florida Statutes, chapter 421, authorizes the
establishment of such authorities. In 1940 the Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the statute as a general welfare act resting on the police power of the
state.2 6 Two years earlier the court had rendered its first opinion in the
public housing area; until now this decision in Marvin v. Housing Authority
of Jacksonville2r has not precluded public housing construction, but it may
portend doubt on expansion of the program in Florida. The Housing
Authority involved in Marvin had been created under chapter 17981, Acts of
1937, now encompassed in chapter 421; the authority had the power to
undertake slum clearance and exercise eminent domain. The act was found
19. See R. FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 82-89 (1959). See generally Ebenstein, The Law of Public Housing, 23 MINN. L. REV. 879 (1939).
20. United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.)
aff'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), petition for cert. dismissed, 294 U.S. 735 (1935). But see
Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1938) (recognizing that slum clearance
and low-cost housing have a beneficial effect upon the nation as a whole by reducing
illness, disease, and crime; aiding morals; increasing employment; and stimulating industry
in a particular community, even though some parts of the nation may not immediately
feel the benefits of such activity).
21. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153, 279 N.Y.S.
299 (1936).
22. See Annot., 172 A.L.R. 967 (1948); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1075 (1941).
23. R. FISHER, supra note 19, at 86-89.
24. Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888.
25. Cf. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, §2 (11), 50 Stat. 889.
26. Higbee v. Housing Authority, 143 Fla. 560, 197 So. 479 (1940).
27. Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938).
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valid under substantive due process despite the contention that low-cost
housing and slum clearance was not a public purpose. In commenting on
2
the powers of all housing authorities under the act, the court observed:
It has been granted power so that its objectives may be accomplished,
viz., the clearance of slums and the eradication of slum evils in the
different areas of Florida, and to erect in their places low-cost houses
so that persons with low incomes can be more abundantly cared for
and the attendant evils of slum conditions reduced to a minimum.
The difficulty in application of the statute to contemporary housing efforts
evolves from the changing nature of public housing.
Traditional public housing, insufficient in scale to meet present urban
needs, 29 has demonstrated inherent defects that render it of doubtful value
in dealing with the social and economic problems of the slums. Public
housing projects have usually become miniature ghettos in themselves, offering a living environment residents find intolerable3 0 Public housing is constructed according to popular concepts of how the poor should be permitted
to live, without considering that its Spartan shabbiness becomes a permanent
form of blight upon the community.-1 Constructed in dilapidated neighborhoods, such projects have separated low-income residents physically as well
as psychologically from higher-income areas.3 2 Rigidly enforced maximum
income limits have made public housing a barrier to integration of economic
groups and have probably encouraged racial segregation.33 In larger cities
public housing has now been directed primarily to, the elderly.3 4 Furthermore,
public housing has proved to be at least fifteen per cent higher in costs than
privately financed housing.3 5
28.

Id. at 617, 183 So. at 156. But see Lott v. Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313 (1939).

29. In its thirty-year history, the low-rent housing program has completed only
660,129 units, despite a 1949 congressional authorization of 800,000 units to be built over
a six-year period. Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1968, at 2, col. 8. See also RioT RaEorT,
supra note 1, at 467-79. PmEuST's COMm. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 60-1,

88 (1969).
30. See C. ABRAMS, THE Crry Is THE FRoNrim 35 (1965); A. SCHORPR, SLUMS AND SocIL
INsEcURuTY 113 (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Social Security Admin., Div. of
Research & Statistics, Rep. No. 1, 1963); Hartman, The Limitations of Public Housing, 29
AM. INSTITUE op PLANNERS J. 283 (1963); Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public
Housing,35 TaaPLE L.Q. 163 (1962).
31. Hearings on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design Before the Subcomm.
on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1967)
(testimony of William Slayton, Exec. Vice President, Urban America).
32. See A. Scnopa, supra note 30, at 46-51.
33. Id. at 111; Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, 27 ARcHurcrup.A.
FORUM 140 (1957).
34. See Comment, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 508, 511-12
(1967). This comment provides a useful discussion of the status of government low-income
housing programs prior to the enactment of the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968.
35. Amdursky, The Urban Crisis, Private Enterprise and State Constitutions: A Plan
for Action, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 618, 620 n.20 (1968) (statement of Robert C. Weaver, former
Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Aug. 5, 1967).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

In response to these criticisms, public housing efforts in the last three
years have centered around the concepts of rehabilitation, 36 the "turnkey"
approach,3 7 and leasing of private dwellings for low-income families. 38
While it appears that these approaches are being utilized to a limited extent
in Florida,3 9 and although there has not been a challenge to the utilization of
these techniques, two cases suggest difficulty for any public housing program
that goes beyond slum clearance in the urban core and expands to single-unit
4
leased and rehabilitated facilities in the suburbs. 0
In a case arising in Panama City, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the housing authority could acquire realty but could not turn it over to
private interests for development of a proposed low-rent housing project
for the naval personnel under private control. 41 The arrangement was constitutional only "if the Authority can do it as the body politic that it is, and
retain control . . . after completion, and keep it a public project from start
to finish. ' ' 42 In view of the lack of public control in various stages of the
turnkey and leasing approaches to public housing, the Lewis case might
impose barriers.
In another decision handed down in September 1965, the Florida supreme
court invalidated a rural development plan for the construction of houses
36. Rehabilitation encompasses development of additional units of low-income housing
through acquisition and repair of existing units, as contrasted to new construction. Rehabilitation is accomplished either through contracting out the work, after acquisition, to
private builders, or having the authority utilize its own staff to perform the work. A
third method provides for selection of properties that have already been renovated by the
private builder. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 29, at
100-12; Ledbetter, Public Housing- A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 490, 513-15 (1967); McGuire, Rehabilitation for Public Housing, 22 J.
HOUSING 595 (1965).
37. The "turnkey" technique permits the local housing authority to purchase a "packaged deal" from a builder or developer. The authority invites a landholding private developer to build a project, fix the price, and buy the finished development. The 1968
Housing and Urban Development Act featured a significant expansion of this approach.
See H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1968). See generally Ledbetter, supra
note 36, at 517-18.
38. The leasing program is authorized by the Housing Act of 1937, §23, 42 U.S.C.
§1421b (1964), as amended (Supp. III, 1968). Once the authorities have obtained local
and federal government approval, the housing authority can lease standard housing and
sublease to persons eligible for public housing; or the authority can enter into agreements
with owners of substandard dwellings whereby the owners will upgrade the units before
the authority will accept them. See 114 CONG. REc. E6442 (daily ed. July 12, 1968). See
generally U.S. DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE LEASING PROGRAM FOR
Low-INCOME FAMILIES (1966).
39. See, e.g., HUD and Municipal Developments, 42 FLA. MUN. REcoRD, Sept. 1968,
at 11 (notes grant for leasing 198 housing units in Jacksonville and use of turnkey method
for purchase of 104 low-rent, high-rise homes in Orlando); id. Nov. 1968, at 11 (notes
Pinellas County utilization of 16 rehabilitated public housing units).
40. See Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of Tampa, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959),
wherein the court, in dictum, notes the fundamental purpose of the Housing Authority
Law is the clearance of slum areas and construction of low-rental houses thereon. Id. at
748-50.
41. Lewis v. Peters, 66 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1953).
42. Id. at 493-94.
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to be sold or leased to private individuals, on the ground that the plan
43
would not accomplish a public purpose.
In June 1964 the Washington County Development Authority had resolved to borrow 244,000 dollars from the United States through the Farmers'
Home Administration (FHA) of the Department of Agriculture and to
execute an installment promissory note for that amount. The indebtedness
was to be incurred pursuant to a larger rural development project of which
the specific resolution was a part. The homes were to be sold or leased at
appraised market value as determined by the Administration to purchasers or
lessees approved by the Government. It was provided that the note would
be paid solely from the authority's income from the project.
The Washington County Development Authority issued a certificate of
indebtedness (promissory note) to the federal government in the amount of
244,000 dollars. The state argued that the housing plan was invalid under
section 10, article IX, of the Florida constitution of 1885, which prohibited
the pledging or lending of the credit of the state or any political subdivision,
unit, or agency to any individual, corporation, or association. 4 4 The authority's
indebtedness to the United States was to be satisfied by the private homeowners' mortgage payments to the authority. Thus, the state concluded, there
was a pledging of state credit, through the authority, for the benefit of the
individual homeowner.
The supreme court recognized that the county as a whole would benefit
from the housing project but considered the real question to be whether
the community itself could go into business to receive a benefit that it would
otherwise receive if the project were executed by private enterprise. The
court held that such a project could not be construed to be for a public
purpose. The majority recognized that the constitutional prohibitions had
been held to be satisfied where the private benefit was only incidental to the
project,45 but held that the plan at issue was the converse: the primary benefit
would be to persons securing homes while the public advantage would be
only incidental. Ironically, the court was forced to conclude: "Laudable as
is the effort of the people to lift their locality to a more prosperous condition
by their own bootstraps, so to speak, we do not think it can be done within
the framework of our laws. Sec. 10, Art. IX, seems completely to bar the
way."4 6 This finding that the Washington County housing projects were not
related to public health, public safety, public morals, or public welfare and
hence did not meet the requisite tests of public purpose would seem to hinder
efforts to expand public housing beyond its traditional role as an element of
a slum clearance effort.
Yet even if expansion of public housing is not barred by such constitutional impediments, and even if investment and expenditures in public
housing should ever approach a level equal to the scale of present urban

43.
44.
45.
46.

State v. Washington County Dev. Authority, 178 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1965).
Article VII, §10 of the 1968 constitution retains this prohibition.
Id. at 574.
Id.
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needs, it is unlikely that public housing will form a significant contribution
to Florida's urban community development. Florida's efforts in public housing
are dependent upon federal support of this approach to low-income housing.
Yet, in recent years federal efforts in public housing have fallen short of even
the original 1949 goal.47 The trend of recent federal programs has been
toward incentives for home ownership and toward private rental by lowincome groups.
Although Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance was
originally intended to permit financing of low- and moderate-income homes,
which would otherwise present risks too great for the private mortgage
market, the FHA has nonetheless been extremely reluctant to insure mortgages
for low-income families under its regular program because of the high element
of risk.48 Partially to remedy this, a special section 221 (h) program was
enacted in 1966 to provide subsidized, insured mortgages to low-income home
buyers. 49 Even though repeatedly labeled a "demonstration program," and
limited in authority to 2,000 such mortgages, this program was the precursor
of title I of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. 50 This provision was intended to enable low-income families to purchase their own
homes by providing a federal subsidy that could bring down the effective
rate of interest of the purchaser's home mortgage. The subsidy would
amount to the difference between twenty per cent of the family's monthly
income and the required monthly payment under the mortgage for principal,
interest, taxes, insurance, and mortgage insurance premium. In every case,
however, the purchaser would be required to make payments at least equal
to the payment that would be required if the mortgage were made at a rate
of one per cent.5 1 This title further established a Special Risk Insurance Fund,

47.

Cf. note

29

supra. See also N. KEITH, HOUSING AMERIcA'S Low- AND MODERATE4-6 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Rep. No. 7, (1968)).
48. In 1966, of all families whose home mortgages were insured by FHA under §203
of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1709 (1966), only 1.6% had incomes below $4,000;
about half of all §203 mortgages were for families with incomes over $8,000. SuBcomMt. ON
INCOME FAMILIES

HOUSING AND URBAN

AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE

COMM.

ON BANKING

AND

CURRENCY,

90th

Cong.,

FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS 56, table E-11

(Comm. Print
1967). However, there have been recent indications that the FHA might reverse this
trend, see Hearings on Housing and Urban Development Legislation of 1968 Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 128-29, 305-06 (1968). See generally Hearings on FinancialInstitutions and
the Urban Crisis Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking & Currency, supra note 15, at 157-61.
49. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, §310 (a), 12 U.S.C.
§17151(h) (Supp. III, 1968), amending National Housing Act §221, 12 U.S.C. §1715 (1964).
50. National Housing Act §235, 12 U.S.C. §1715 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§1715z (1969).
51. Id. at §1715z(c). This provision would operate as follows: Jack Smith, who has an
income of $4,200, has applied for federal assistance under this provision. His income is
well within the $6,000 local limitation for program eligibility, so assistance is approved.
Jack goes to a local lending institution and obtains a mortgage loan of $12,000, to be repaid over a 35-year period. The Government draws up a contract with the private lender
to pay him a monthly interest subsidy on Jack's mortgage. Assuming a market interest
Ist Sess.,

PROGRESS

REPORT ON

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss5/4

8

Schwenke: The Quasi-Public Corporation and Constitutional Revision--Formula

1969]

THE QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION

which would not be intended to be actuarially sound and under which
claims would be paid on mortgages insured under FHA low-income
52
programs.
Incentives for rental housing for low-income families was provided in
title II of the 1968 Act. This program of subsidies was for the construction
or rehabilitation of rental and cooperative housing; federal assistance payments would cover the difference between the market rate mortgage and
the amount that would be required on a mortgage bearing an interest rate
of one per cent.5 3 To qualify for mortgage insurance under this section, a
mortgagor would have to be a nonprofit organization, a cooperative, or a
limited-dividend entity.5 4 This requirement would effectively preclude participation by existing housing authorities in Florida. This title also provided
that tenants in projects built under this program pay twenty-five per cent of
their income as rent up to the full market rental. 55
The rent supplement program, which was instituted in 196556 and which
provides direct government subsidization of individual families' rent payments,
57
was acclaimed as the federal solution to the low-income housing dilemma.
Under rent supplement, nonprofit, limited-dividend, and cooperative sponsors obtain federally-insured mortgages at market interest rates on buildings
that they rent to low-income tenants. The tenants pay twenty-five per cent
of their family incomes toward these rentals; the Government makes up the
difference in direct payments to the landlord. The rent supplement concept
could avoid many of the evils of public housing. But congressional opposition,
due partly to vicissitudes in the scope and operation of the approach, 58 has
kept appropriations at a level inadequate for it to have had a substantial
impact on the slums. 5 9 Furthermore, rising costs of construction and financ-

rate of 6V%, Jack's required monthly payment is $99.66. As long as his income remains
the same, his payment will be $70 (20% of his monthly income) and the government subsidy will be $29.66. His income will be recertified every two years, and appropriate adjustments will be made in the federal assistance payments to reflect any change.
52. National Housing Act §237, 12 U.S.C. §1715 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.

§1715z-2 (1969).
53. National Housing Act §236, 12 U.S.C. §1715 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. §1715z-1

(1969).
54. 12 U.S.C.A. §1715z-l(j)(3). Cf. 12 U.S.C. §§1715l(d)(1), (d)(3) (Supp. I1 1968).
This requirement intentionally was structured to insure that public agencies would not
serve as mortgagors on these projects. This was done to remove the stigma attached to

renting from a public authority rather than from a private landlord. H.R. REP. No. 1585,
supra note 37.
55. 12 U.S.C.A. §1715 z-1(f) (1969).
56. Housing Act of 1961, §101, 12 U.S.C. §17151(d)(3) (Supp. III 1968), amending
National Housing Act §221, 12 U.S.C. §1715 (1964).
57. For a history of the rent supplement concept and its legislative vagaries, see Krier,
The Rent Supplement Program of 1965: Out of the Ghetto, Into the... ?, 19 STAN. L. Ray.
555 (1967). See generally Welfeld, Rent Supplements and the Subsidy Dilemma, 32 LAw
& CoNTams. Pnoa. 465 (1967).

58. See Lawson, Housing,2 Crry Jan. 1968, at 29.
59. The initial appropriation (a total of $32 million) came in fiscal 1967 and 1966.
The initial authorization had been $150 million, but no funds were appropriated the first
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ing, at least before the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, have
made investment in rent-supplemented buildings unprofitable under existing
60
FHA rent ceilings.
Urban Renewal
Even if all authorized housing efforts were fully operative and providing
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family," 61 comprehensive urban community development could not be
achieved without involvement in other programs. The urban renewal program is visualized as such an adjunct. Urban renewal may be viewed as
62
involving three steps:
(1) land assembly (the bringing under one ownership of all of the
land in an area marked for redevelopment);
(2) land clearance and the removal of existing structures;
(3) redevelopment of the area by construction of improvements in
accordance with a development plan, keyed in theory to a master
community plan.
State legislation in this area preceded federal efforts. In 1945 the Florida
legislature purported to provide municipalities with a means of undertaking
urban renewal programs. 63 The Florida law appears to have been based
upon a model suggested by the National Public Housing Conference, a
political lobby for nationwide public housing authorities.64 The Florida act
provided for the establishment in each city of a municipal housing authority
charged with the task of initiating redevelopment projects and responsible
for the utilization of any available federal funds.65 The act further prescribed
the use of eminent domain and the lease or sale of condemned land to private
developers. This law, a general law, was similar to urban redevelopment
statutes in other jurisdictions; these enabling laws have been held constitutional in thirty-seven jurisdictions, notwithstanding provisions for sale or
66
lease of condemned property to private developers.
Federal support of urban renewal was implemented by title I of the
Housing Act of 1949.67 This act authorized capital grants for the execution
year. The total authorization through fiscal 1969 was $150 million, but total appropriations
had been only $42 million, as the 1968 fiscal appropriation had been only $10 million. For
fiscal 1969, $25 million additional appropriation was provided. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 467
(1968). See also H. R. RES'. No. 1585, supra note 37, at 25-26.
60. Note, Government Programs To Encourage Private Investment in Low-Income
Housing, 81 H~av. L. Rav. 1295, 1299 n.35 (1968).
61. Preamble to the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §1441a (1964).
62. Fordham, The Challenge of Contemporary Urban Problems, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 275,
279 (1953).
63. Fla. Laws ch. 23077 (1945).
64. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal, 116
U. PA. L. Rav. 25, 38 n.68 (1967).
65. Fla. Laws ch. 23077, §§2-3 (1945). See also 42 U.S.C. §§1450-55 (1964).
66. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1955).

67. 42 U.S.C. §§1450-55 (1966).
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of renewal plans, along with loans and technical assistance. To qualify for
most forms of aid, the local agency had to present to the Housing and Home
Finance Administrator a "workable program" of urban renewal for the
community.6 Because of the importance of federal financial assistance, providing either two-thirds or three-fourths of the total costs, state enabling acts
and local programs should have been oriented towards meeting federal
requirements. In Florida they were not.
In 1950 the Housing Authority of Daytona Beach sought to purchase or
acquire by eminent domain six and one-half acres of real estate in an area
zoned for commercial and light industry. The land at that time was inhabited
by low-income families. After condemnation, the land was to be turned over
to private commercial and industrial enterprises. In Adams v. Housing
Authority9 the Florida supreme court held that the acquisition of real estate
for such disposition was not for public use or purpose and that the statute
authorizing the procedure was unconstitutional. Four provisions of the
Florida constitution were found to have been violated. 70 Vitiating the Daytona
Beach plan as a real estate promotion scheme disguised as a redevelopment
plan,71 the majority noted their belief in the adequacy of the city's police
power to abate a blighted area. As a result of this case, Florida was left
with no constitutional general law upon which a municipality might rely
in attempting urban redevelopment. It is today the only state containing
several large urban areas that lacks such a general authority.
The City of Tampa, acting pursuant to the Urban Renewal Law of 1957,72
a special act applicable only to that city, undertook a redevelopment project
68. Housing Act of 1949, §101 (c), 42 U.S.C. §1451 (c) (1964), as amended. The seven
elements of a workable program, as defined administratively by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, include: effectively enforced codes and ordinances; a comprehensive plan for community development; analysis of blighted areas to determine their
appropriate treatment- clearance, rehabilitation, or conservation; adequate administrative
organization; adequate financing; a program for housing displaced families; and citizen
participation in renewal plans. J. LowE, CrrrEs IN A RAcE wrrH TIME 36 (1967).
69. 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952), noted in 13 U. FLA. L. RXv. 344 (1960) and 28 TUL. L.
REv. 96 (1953).
70. The court held the following provisions, hi. at 670, of the Florida Constitution to
have been violated and gave the indicated reasons therefore: "(1) Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights in that the inalienable right of the citizens to acquire, possess and protect
property would be denied; public authorities would be permitted to take one man's
property against his will and make it available to another group for their private purpose
rather than a public use, (2) Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights and Section 29 of
Article XVI in that the taking of private property for a purpose or use not public, to wit,
for the purpose of selling or leasing the same for private use, profit and gain to other
individuals, corporations, or associations is attempted to be authorized and consummated,
(3)Section 5 of Article IX in that the expenditure of public funds and the assessment and
imposition of taxes for a purpose not public nor municipal would be authorized, (4)
Section 10 of Article IX in that an attempt is made to authorize and consummate the
appropriation of public or municipal funds or money, or the loaning of credit of a
municipality to corporations, associations, institutions, or individuals for a purpose not
public nor municipal and for private gain and profit."
71. 60 So. 2d at 666.
72. Fla. Laws ch. 57-1904 (1957).
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that involved forty acres of slum area within the city. In Grubstein v. Urban
Renewal Agency,7 3 involving a suit to enjoin the City of Tampa and its

urban agency from further pursuance of the redevelopment program, the
Florida supreme court upheld the act. The court recognized that slum as
distinguished from blight clearance was per se a public purpose.74 The
court further held that the public purpose of the plan was not defeated
because of lease or sale of the property to private interests, a possible nonpublic use. Here perhaps is a conceptual merger of public use with public
purpose. The main object for which the land was taken was slum clearance,
a public purpose. The public interest dominates and thus the only private
use, development by private enterprise, is incidental to the over-all purpose.
The area involved was to be returned primarily to residential use in conjunction with neighborhood commercial establishments to serve the residents.
The court emphasized that the decision was confined to that part of the act
relating to slum clearance and that it expressed no opinion on that part of
the act relating to blighted areas.7 5
Confronted with the Adams case, the court in Grubstein relied heavily
on the definitions of "slum" and "blighted area" to distinguish the two.
Only a blighted area was sought to be redeveloped in Adams, and no relation
to the public health, safety, or welfare that would justify use of eminent
domain was found.
Justice Thornal, concurring in Grubstein, went further and asserted that
the Adams decision had been "whittled away" to the point where its judgment was nothing more than the disposition of the particular project
proposed in that case. 76 In other words, the Adams decision need not have

73. 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959).

74. Fla. Laws ch. 57-1904, §§18(f), (g) (1957), define "slum" and "blighted area" as
follows: "'Slum area' shall mean an area in which there is a predominance of buildings or
improvements, whether residential or non-residential, which by reason of dilapidation,
deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation,

or open spaces, high density of population and over-crowding, or the existence of conditions
which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such
factors, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, or crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
"'Blighted area' shall mean an area which by reason of the presence of a substantial
number of slum, deteriorated or deteriorating structures, predominance of defective or
inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility or usefulness, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other improvements,
diversity of ownership, tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of
the land, defective or unusual conditions of title, or the existence of conditions which
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of
housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use: Provided,
that if such blighted area consists of open land the conditions contained in the proviso
in Section 6 (d) shall apply: And provided further, that any disaster area referred to in
subsection (g) of Section 6 shall constitute a 'blighted area.'"
75. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1959).
76. Id. at 755.
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gone so far as to declare the Housing Authorities Law77 unconstitutional but
should have been confined to declaring unconstitutional the particular plan
involved. Justice Thornal cited State v. Cotney7 8 as the case where "this
Court for all practical purposes, tolled the tocsin that sounded the death
knell of the judgment in Adams v. Daytona Beach Housing Authority."79 This
conclusion is perhaps weakened by the court's later rejection, in State v. Clay
County Development Authority,0 of its Cotney holding. Even so, Justice
Thornal's opinion reflects the conclusion of many critics."'
Justice O'Connell, dissenting with Justices Thomas and Drew, was unable
to distinguish the Tampa Act and the Housing Authorities Law, finding
"similar, if not identical circumstances, factual and legal."8' 2 As to the distinction of slums and blighted areas, the issue was never raised either at trial
or before the supreme court and hence was not an issue to be judicially
determined in either Adams or Grubstein. 3 Application of the strict Adams
interpretation of the Florida constitution led Justice O'Connell to conclude
4
that the urban renewal scheme was invalid8
The narrow question of blight removal, pursuant to an urban renewal
program, has yet to come before the Florida courts; until the question appears,
it must remain a matter of conjecture how the court will hold. Apparent
emphasis previously given by the court to the distinction between blight and
slum precludes a prediction that the court will rule favorably on a redevelopment plan to remedy blight, except perhaps in cases where it can be shown
that the blighted area has reached a point where only urban redevelopment
can ward off a threatened debilitation of the publics health, welfare, and
morals8 5 Other jurisdictions, while not distinguishing slum from blight,
77. Fla. Laws, ch. 23077 (1945).

78. 104 So. 2d 346 (la. 1958).
79. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So. 2d 745, 755 (Nla. 1959).
80. 140 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
81. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959); Fordham,
supra note 62, at 429; Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 U.
Fx.. L. REv. 312 (1953).
82. 115 So. 2d at 758.
83. Id. at 757.
84. Id. at 758-59, which states: "IMhe basic question, as I see it, is whether the Adams
case is precedent to be followed under the doctrine of stare decisis .... A constitutional

provision is intended to be a continuing instrument of government. Nevertheless, its
meaning is fixed when the people adopt it.... The fact that situations, such as those
present in the instant case, were not anticipated when the constitution was adopted does
not mean that it should be given a different meaning when applied to the new conditions.
A constitution must be ...given the same meaning and intent which it had when adopted.
Its flexibility must never be achieved at the expense of maintaining uniformity in its
use and construction.... I hold that we should not by judicial fiat do what the people
acting through their elected representatives have determined not to do.
"It is such action of other courts in our nation that has thrust upon us a dilemma and
created a turmoil, involving the proper role of courts as opposed to lawmaking bodies, that
have done untold damage to courts everywhere in our land and caused doubt that courts
do or should have the ultimate power to determine the validity of statutes and meaning
and application of constitutional provisions.:
85. The court in Grubstein criticized the definition of "blighted area" in ch. 23077 as
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as those terms are used by the Florida court, have held blight elimination
86
to be a public purpose.
As a result of the upholding of the Tampa Act, coupled with the refusal
to reestablish the Housing Authorities Act, special acts to permit urban renewal within twenty municipalities in Florida have been enacted since 195787
With minor differences, these acts have all utilized the provisions of the
Tampa Act.88 This special act procedure, in effect, finds the state legislature
somewhat blindly creating institutions that shape the future development of
part of the state on the basis of legislative courtesy. In addition to these
special acts, Dade County has established an extensive program of urban
renewal, acting pursuant to powers granted in the charter of Metropolitan
Dade County.8 9
In 1967, Representative Gerald Lewis introduced a bill in the Florida
legislature to establish general statewide authority for urban renewal.90
containing elements that would not have any direct relation to the public health, safety,
or welfare. Fla. Laws, ch. 23077, §2(1) (1945) defined "blighted areas" as: "[A]reas (including slum areas) with buildings or improvements which, by reason of age, deterioration,
dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation,
light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout,
or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or
welfare of the community." (emphasis added). The Grubstein court criticized the inclusion of the emphasized portions, 115 So. 2d at 750. Yet it appears that many of the
acceptable elements of the 1945 blight definition are now included in the definition in the
1957 Act. See note 74 supra. Compare Cannata v. State, 14 App. Div. 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d
457, with Crommett v. Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954) and Redevelopment
Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954), cert. denied,
Van Hoff v. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco, 348 U.S. 897 (1954) with Miller v.
City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 385, 378 P.2d 463 (1968).
86. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Cannata v. State, 14
App. Div. 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1954); Bellowsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa.
329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
87. All references are to Fla. Laws: Cocoa, ch. 67-1229 (1967), 63-1232 (1963), 61-2020
(1961); Daytona Beach, ch. 67-1274 (1967), 61-2067 (1961); Ft. Pierce, ch. 67-1392 (1967);
Key West, ch. 67-1596 (1967), 63-1493 (1963); Live Oak, ch. 67-1650 (1967), 65-1860 (1965);
Niceville, ch. 67-1767 (1967); Titusville, ch. 67-2137 (1967); Lake Worth, 65-1793 (1965);
Lakeland, ch. 65-1805 (1965), 61-2382 (1961); St. Petersburg, ch. 65-2207 (1965), 59-1809
(1954); Starke, ch. 65-2286 (1965); Tampa, ch. 65-2303 (1965), 57-1904 (1957); Ormond
Beach, ch. 63-1728 (1963); Palatka, ch. 63-1733 (1963); Sarasota, ch. 63-1888 (1963);
Auburndale, ch. 61-1867 (1961); Ft. Lauderdale, ch. 61-2165 (1961); Melbourne, ch. 61-2486
(1961); Winter Haven, ch. 61-3007 (1961); Tallahassee, ch. 59-1908 (1959).
88. The similarity between the Tampa Act, Fla. Laws ch. 57-1904 (1957), and the
Daytona Beach Act, Fla. Laws, ch. 61-2067 (1961), enabled the Florida supreme court to
uphold the Daytona Beach law in Hill v. Huger, 171 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1965). See Hill v.
Huger, 346 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1965).
89. CHARTER OF METROPOLrrAN DADE COUNTY, FLA. § 1.01 (A) (8) (1968); The Board of
County Commissioners has the power to "[ejstablish and administer housing, slum clearance,
urban renewal, conservation, flood and beach erosion control, air pollution control, and
drainage programs and cooperate with government agencies and private enterprises in the
development and operation of these programs." Cf. DADE COUNTY, FLA. METROPOLITAN CODE
§§2-186-189 (1968) (establishing a Housing and Urban Development Department), and ch.
30A (text of the Urban Renewal Act for the county).
90. Fla. H.B. 1481 (1967).
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As with previous special acts, this proposal initially was quite similar to the
Tampa Act. The bill was enacted, after significant amendment, as chapter
67-734.91
The 1967 Urban*Renewal Law offered several significant advances over
the 1945 proposal in the Housing Authorities Act, and any of its special act

predecessors. First, it provided the authority for county-wide, as contrasted
to single-municipality, renewal programs. 92 Moreover, it authorized utilization of existing Housing Authority units to operate the efforts in urban
renewal.

3

In view of the necessity of dose correlation of renewal and housing

operations, especially in terms of relocating those displaced by the demolition
of the slums, this combination should prove beneficial. Recently enacted
federal programs to support application of "air rights" 94 to low-income
housing and blight removal could now be utilized within the state.95 Finally,
it authorized preparation of neighborhood and community-wide plans for
renewal and the establishment of planning commissions with authority to
adopt and revise general plans for the physical development of any county
or municipality within the state.96 This would have been the first general
planning legislation in the history of the state.
There were, however, several major defects in the law as enacted. It did
not authorize state participation in new federal programs in advance acquisition of land for urban renewal 97 and did not provide interim assistance for
blighted areas. 98 It neglected to guarantee relocation for those displaced by

renewal.

9

The law continued the tradition of project selection on the basis

91. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734 (1967). For development of the act in its final form, compare
the proposed legislation, with FLA. H.R. JouRN., 1967 RrG. Sass. 1995-98, 2015-16, 2029-30,
2034, 2061 (1967). Fla. S. 513 (1969), a comprehensive urban renewal bill, similar in structure
to the Tampa Act and drafted by the Legislative Reference Bureau in conjunction with the
STAFF REPORT TO INTERIM CoMMrrrEE ON URBAN AFFAIRS OF TmE FLOPDA LEoixsL&TuR,

supra

note 8, passed the Senate by a vote of 28-14. Miami Herald, May 21, 1969, at 14-A, col. 1.
A companion bill, H.B. 942, was passed on June 4, 1969, and the approved legislation was
before the Governor at the time this note went to press.
92. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734, §1 (1967).
93. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734, §20 (1967).
94. "Air rights" refers to the air-space over existing faclities, such as highways, or
public parking areas. Cf. Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d
138 (1966). See generally Housing Act of 1949, §110, 42 US.C. §1460(c) (1964) as amended.
95. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734, §4 (i) (8), (9) (1967).
96. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734, §9 (1967).
97. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, §701, .42 U.S.C. 3101 (Supp. III,
1968).
98. Housing Act of 1949, §118, 42 U.S.C. §1466 (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
99. Relocation has been a major difficulty encountered in conjunction with urban
renewal efforts. Although federal requirements stipulate that grants shall not be made
without an effective relocation program at the local level, 42 U.S.C. 1455 (1966), individuals
have not, in the past, possessed standing to challenge lack of a relocation program. Johnson
v. Redevelopment Agency of City of Oakland, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 915 (1963). But see Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968). Cf., Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968). See generally discussing the problems of guaranteeing relocation, C. ABRAMS, supra note 30; MiAmie STuny TEAM, supra note
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of what is removed from a city-slums or blighted districts- rather than
directly relating the project qualifications to satisfaction of community
planning objectives. Without this direct relationship, urban renewal in the
past has often disregarded and even negated the very plans that were prepared
under the authority of the urban renewal law.100

Perhaps the most fundamental objection to the 1967 Urban Renewal
Law is that in its final form it is not in fact a population or general act
authorizing urban renewal. By amendment,101 the original bill was changed
to apply only to "all counties having a population of not less than three
hundred and ninety thousand (390,000) and not more than four hundred and
fifty thousand (450,000) [and] to all counties having a population of more
than nine hundred thousand (900,000), according to the 1960 decennial
census..1..,,02 This amendment had the effect of limiting the applicability
to Dade and Hillsborough counties, both of which already had effective and
on-going programs. The intent of the exacting range was clear: the limits
could not have extended 5,000 higher, lest the law would have included
Duval County; they could not have been 20,000 lower, lest Pinellas County
would have been eligible. 103 It has been suggested that general acts of
special application, such as this population act, are unconstitutional as
violative of constitutional prohibitions against use of special laws to provide
for the jurisdiction, powers, duties, and privileges of cities and towns;
further, such acts may be applied only to a single city or county. 0 4 However,
the legislature's application of this approach as a frequent method of
amendment precludes any certainty on this question.
Even with a general act of this type, the full potential of urban renewal
is far from realizable in Florida. A number of later changes in the federal

3, at 1; NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, How THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT BuiLDs GHETTOS (1967); Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183 (1968);
Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
Note, Family Relocation in Urban Renewal, 82 HARV. L. REv. 864 (1969). Fla. S. 300 and
H.B. 546 (1969) would have required relocation payments and guaranteed the availability
of adequate housing in any state program causing business or residential dislocation. The
Senate bill died in committee. FLA. S. JoUR., 1969 REG. Sass. 180.
100. Mandelker, supra note 64, at 29-31.
101. FLA. H.R. Joutr., REG. Sass. 2016 (1967) (amendment offered by Rep. Dubbin).
102. Fla. Laws, ch. 67-734, §1 (1967).
103. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CITY AND COUNTY DATA BOOK
42-53 (1962) listed the 1960 decennial census population of Hillsborough County as 397,788;
Dade County as 935,047; Duval County as 455,411; Pinellas County as 374,665. For current
estimates, see STAFF REPORT TO INTERIM COMMITTEE ON URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE FLORIDA
LEGIsLATURE, supra note 8; Grove, supra note 8, at 71.
104. L. BETH & W. HAVARD, THE POLITICS OF MIS-REPRSENTATION 182-85 (1962). See
also Dauer & Havard, The Florida Constitution of 1885 -A Critique, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. I,
60-65 (1955). Similar special law provisions are included in the 1968 constitution, so the
strict constitutional question remains.
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urban renewal program, since the 1949 Act, reflects a concept broadened from
slum clearance to urban renewal and redevelopment. The program envisioned by these acts encompasses not only the clearance and redevelopment
of substandard and unsanitary areas, but also the conservation and improvement of areas that are deteriorating but are not yet slums. They focus on
the economic, social, environmental, and physical redevelopment and
revitalization of the community as a whole rather than on housing alone or
on isolated urban renewal projects within limited areas. These programs
are primarily designed to prevent, rather than simply remove, urban blight
and deterioration. They are not limited to residential areas or developments, but include the renewal of commercial and industrial areas as well. 0s
Yet in Florida any urban renewal effort beyond strict slum clearance is in
jeopardy. Zoning and police powers are considered to be adequate to control
and prevent blight and deterioration. 06 Other jurisdictions have not found
07
the zoning power alone an effective weapon to control and prevent blight,
but even if this were the case Florida is the only urban state in the nation
without sound general enabling legislation for urban planning and plan
implementation.s Moreover, the Adams opinion rejected urban renewal in
the only instance in which the Florida courts have ruled upon commercial
development, as distinguished from residential usage, of the project area.
It should further be recognized that even an effective urban renewal
program contains inherent problems. Some, such as relocation, have been
noted as weaknesses in the 1967 Florida law. Generally, urban renewal has
been charged with destroying more housing than it created. 0 9 Where it has
provided any new housing in cleared slum areas, it has usually been for
moderate- or higher-income families.:11 Numerous renewal sites have remained
vacant for extended periods because of delays inherent in the program and

105. Up to 35% of total authorized federal capital grants may be applied to nonresidential purposes if the "governing body of the local public agency determines that the redevelopment of such an area for predominantly nonresidential uses is necessary for the
proper development of the community." Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
§305, 42 U.S.C. §1460 (c) (Supp. III, 1968).
106. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663, 664 (Fla. 1952).
107. See, e.g., Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 37 Del. Ch. 202, 139 A.2d
476 (1958); Foeller v. Housing Authority, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953); Belovsky v.
Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947). Cf. Herzinger v. Mayor, 203 Md.
49, 98 A.2d 87 (1953). See generally Mandelker, Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment,
28 TUL L. Rxv. 96, 103-05 (1953).
108. "It is true that through special acts, and through the existing general enabling act
for municipal zoning only, cities and some counties have a small measure of the planning
and plan implementation powers that are so badly needed. But these special acts, variously
written and all too often poorly written make up a potpourri of legislation which bedevils
developers, confuses the courts, provides income for attorneys and planners, leaves citizens
tearing their hair, and generally contributes to planning insanity in this State." Bartley,
A New Approach to Urban Redevelopment, 19 FLA. PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 1968, at
10.
109. The Case Against Urban Desegregation,12 SOCIAL WORK 16 (1967).
110. Rior REPORT, supra note 1, at 142.
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because of the reluctance of private developers to accept the risk.",' Finally,
urban renewal has proved to be too slow: usually the rate of renewal activity
112
is outstripped by the rate of decay.
Thus, it appears that neither urban renewal nor public housing, as
currently operative in Florida, offers the potential to solve the state's developing urban problems and to provide an effective route to comprehensive urban
development in metropolitan communities.
THE QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION

These conclusions have caused a search for new solutions to the urban
problem. One emerging concept of considerable promise is the "quasi-public"
corporation. This corporate organization is located in the legal spectrum
3
somewhere between purely private and purely governmental corporations."
It may be owned privately and financed jointly with public and private funds
or owned jointly by the government and private interests. It is organized
for a quasi-public purpose, that is, for a purpose that is currently recognized
as relating to a public interest. This may previously have been carried on
customarily by private citizens. Its distinctive characteristic, besides its quasipublic purpose, is governmental participation either as part owner or partner
or as principal creditor." 4 At the federal level the Communication Satellite
Corporation (Comsat) 1" is an example of a recently developed corporate
organization of this type.
The unique advantage of a quasi-public corporation in the housing and
urban development fields is that it combines the resources and expertise of
private enterprise and government. It can create a relatively risk-free market
for private investment yielding an attractive rate of return. The capital
funds thus generated can be invested in housing for low-income families and
in urban development of the communities in which those families live.
111. M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RNIVAL,
1949-1962 (1964), reviewed, Groberg, Urban Renewal Realistically Reappraised, 30 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 212 (1965). See also C. ABRAMS, supra note 30, ch. 9.
112. Leach, The Federal Urban Renewal Program: A Ten-Year Critique, 25 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 777, 777-78 (1960), notes that in Boston: "'22,000 more dwellings have
fallen into the substandard category. This is nearly three times the amount of poor housing
eliminated in the last ten years.' What is true in Boston is true in virtually every urban
area in the United States."
113. "When [a private corporation] is invested with certain powers of a public nature
to permit it to discharge duties to the public, it loses its strictly private character, and
becomes quasi public." Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 77 Fla. 742, 747, 82 So. 346, 350 (1919). Cf., Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee,
84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 699 (1922); Philadelphia Rural Transit Co. v. City of Philadelphia,
309 Pa. 84, 87, 159 A. 861, 863 (1932), which states that: "[A] private corporation to which
has given ... certain powers of a public nature, such for instance, as the power of eminent
domain, in order [that it may] discharge its duties for the public benefit, in which respect
it differs from an ordinary private corporation, the powers of which are given and exercised exclusively for the profit or advantage of its stockholders."
114. See Lesher, The Non Profit Corporation, 22 Bus. LAW. 951, 960 (1967).
115. 47 U.S.C. 701 et seq. (1964).
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The private development funds created in such metropolitan areas as
Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland demonstrate the effectiveness of this
approach.1 6 Each of these funds has as its purpose industrial, residential, or
commercial development. The Development Fund of ACTION-Housing,
Inc., precipitated the construction of $5 million worth of housing in Pitts7
burgh with loans from it of only 430,000 dollars.11
The Bedford-Stuyvesant Renewal and Redevelopment Corporation,
created by the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, is a notable example of this
new corporate form. Bedford-Stuyvesant is the second largest Negro ghetto
in the nation, containing 400,000 people in a 4,000 acre area in Brooklyn,
New York. In 1960, eighty per cent of the residents were Negro, with half of
the remaining twenty per cent Puerto Rican. The community had only one
high school, so deteriorated that the board of education attempted to close
it. It had no single major source of employment; it had no hospital or
clinic within its boundaries. Despite extensive federal grants to New York
City for urban purposes, through 1965 the district had been unable to secure
a single urban renewal grant.
The corporation acts as sponsor of programs for housing rehabilitation
and renewal, 118 and community development, including the creation and
management of community cultural and recreational facilities. It works with
government, community, and private agencies insuring that jobs created
will be filled predominently by residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant and that programs are developed to train for these jobs. The corporation facilitates the
economic development of the community by providing, under contracts and
agreements, necessary inducements to and cooperation with private industry.
Finally, it is responsible for all daily management of projects.
Major foundation support provided the initial capital required by the
corporation. The Taconic Foundation, Rockefeller Fund, and Ford Foundation all contributed to implementation of detailed planning and development
programs. Utilization of an urban renewal designation for the entire area,
rather than zoning and district or neighborhood planning, permitted greater
community control over land use patterns and facility locations.
Economic planning aims at the creation of a self-supporting, viable
community, with jobs for all residents who can work. Development of light
manufacturing and necessary support services receive special emphasis. The
corporation purchased the largest building in the community, an old bottling
plant, for a headquarters and community center. Local residents, trained to
do the work themselves, accomplished the renovation of the facility. Plans
for a major shopping center have been integrated with both needed community facilities and training programs to assure that residents fill almost
all the sales and clerical jobs and some of the management positions.
116. See generally, ACtION, INC., A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEIECrIED DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
(1964) (unpublished report).
117. ACTION-HoUsING, INC., SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE BoARD OF DnMcroRs, (Sept.

1966).
118. The corporation in 1968 received a pledge of $100 million in mortgage guarantee
funds from the FHA. The money may be used to "buy or rehabilitate homes or consolidate existing debts to them." N.Y. Times, April 2, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
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All programs are developed, so far as possible, on a self-sustaining basis
in an attempt to be independent of the need for public funding or charitable
grants as soon as is practicable. The community plans to acquire title to
most of the land that is redeveloped, in turn leasing it to business or residential users. Ownership will assure steady revenue for the area. Direct
investment by the inhabitants, whether through direct capital contribution or
by providing "sweat equity" in the form of contribution of services, is essential to the approach. The people of Bedford-Stuyvesant have been asked to
contribute toward the purchase of condominium apartments, buy shares in
neighborhood cooperative stores, or invest in local manufacturing
companies.119
NEW YORK STATE CORPORATION FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT

In 1957 a bill creating the Corporation for Urban Development and
Research of New York (CUDR) was passed by both houses of the New York
legislature. However, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller vetoed the bill since
the New York Constitution prohibited grants or loans of public funds to
private or quasi-public corporations. Inasmuch as the Governor doubted the
effectiveness of the corporation without considerable state financial assistance,1 20 he signed a revised version into law on April 10, 1968.121 The new
corporation possesses many of the unique attributes of a partnership between
government and private enterprise, which can be achieved only through a
quasi-public corporation. Examination and evaluation of the corporate
structure and operation suggest that a similar entity in Florida might permit
the state to participate in a more successful attack upon the problems of
urban community development.
12 2
Operations and Structure of the Corporation

Membership in CUDR is open to any corporation, trust, association,
partnership, or individual located or authorized to do business in the State
of New York. Membership certificates are available in amounts of multiples
of 500 dollars; in addition, members pay annual dues. Each member is
119. Hearings on the Federal Role in Urban Affairs Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 13, at 2831-37 (1966) (speech by Senator Robert Kennedy). See also R. KENNEDY, TO
SEEK A NEWER WORLD 51-62 (1967).
120.

See GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM ON BILLS VETOED, NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE

ANNUAL at 347 (1967). S. 3830-A, 3831-B, N.Y. State Legis. Sess. (1967). Both bills were
introduced by Senator H. Douglas Barclay.
121. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§6251-85, 6301-25, 6341-60 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
122. This description of the operation and structure of all three corporations is drawn
from a telephone interview with Robert S. Amdursky, Counsel, N.Y. State Joint Legislative
Committee on Housing & Urban Development, one of the chief draftsmen of the acts, March
20, 1969; interview with partners and associates of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates,
General Counsel for the corporation, in N.Y. City, Nov. 25, 1968; Amdursky, supra note
35; Amdursky, The New York Urban Development Corporation, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J. 100 (1969);
provisions of the acts, N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 173-75 (1968).
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entitled to one vote per 500 dollar certificate; proxy voting is permitted.
There is a nine-man board of directors appointed by the Governor. Four of
the directors are state officials serving ex officio; the remainder are selected
from the private sector. 123 In addition to the board, there is provision for
a membership council of between fifteen and fourty-five members to be
elected by the certificate holders at an annual meeting. The council will
work in liason between the corporation and the community business interests.
It will also compile data and reports for the board, recommend specific
housing and industrial projects, and nominate directors for subsidiary
corporations.
The corporation will be financed initially by certificate capitalization,
membership dues, and grants from private corporations, foundations, and
the federal government. Later it will issue revenue bonds, backed by a
reserve fund comprising a substantial portion of the grants. Its debt obligations will be further secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on the projects
it undertakes or by pledges of its revenues and receipts. As of now, CUDR
is without funds. However, several national foundations have indicated a
willingness to contribute between $1 and $2 million.
CUDR's bonds will be exempt from all state and local taxes; a revenue
ruling has been sought to determine that interest paid on them will not be
subject to federal income tax.1 24 In the drafting stages, New York officials
rejected a suggestion that the ruling be obtained before corporate inception.
Hence, pending receipt of a favorable ruling, CUDR has not attempted to
float any bonds.
The corporation will stimulate private investors to undertake multipurpose industrial, residential, and commercial projects in the state's core
areas. It will create needed jobs in the slums by assisting existing businesses
and inducing new commercial enterprises to locate there.
CUDR will provide seed money, loans of equity capital, and technical
assistance to private developers to enable maximum use of existing state and
federal financial assistance programs. But it will also experiment with new
approaches to urban development.
123. The private directors are Frederick Schoellkopf, Jr., President of the Marine Midland Trust Co. of Western New York; Prof. Kenneth Clark, City University of N. Y.;
Whitney M. Young, Jr., head of the Urban League; George D. Woods, former President
of the World Bank. The ex officio directors are the State Commissioner of Commerce, the

Director of the Office of Planning Coordination, and the Superintendents of Banks and
Insurance. Edward J. Logue, who attained national reputation for his redevelopment work
in Boston and New Haven, has been appointed the corporation's president and chief executive officer.
124. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §103; see Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 24. The
bonding provisions of the acts provide sufficient restrictions to comply with the requirements
of this ruling. Even though the question of exemptions for industrial development bonds
is now in flux, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1969, at 1, col. 1, the officials of the corpo-

ration feel that a distinction should be drawn between general industrial bonds and UDC/
CUDR types since the latter are designed to provide jobs for the hard-core unemployed
and housing in the urban cores, whereas the former are designed for the attraction of
industry and only coincidentally serve other purposes. Telephone interview with Robert
S. Amdursky, supra note 122.
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For example, the corporation will enter into contracts to purchase
housing units constructed by private developers who agree to limit their
profits. CUDR will either sell under cooperative arrangements or rent these
units to low- and middle-income families. This creates a risk-free market for
new privately constructed housing and capitalizes on the ability of private
enterprise to construct housing faster and more economically than can public
agencies. As an alternative, CUDR can purchase the housing from the limited
profit private developer who will then lease it back and manage it at
regulated rental rates. This variation avoids any stigma of public housing by
interposing a purely private landlord between the corporation and the tenants.
CUDR is also empowered to organize subsidiary corporations by resolution of the board. These subsidiaries may be organized under New York's
business corporation law, membership corporations law, or private housing
finance law. The board may transfer to the subsidiary any funds, property,
or project held by the corporation. Since no subsidiaries have yet been
formed, it is not certain if use of the subsidiary form will be limited to
housing applications. Such has been the pattern taken with subsidiaries to
the state's Urban Development Corporation.
Paralleling the operations of CUDR will be the Urban Development
Guarantee Fund of New York. 125 This was a component of the 1967 Act, but
for constitutional reasons was made a separate entity in the 1968 legislation.
The fund is authorized to guarantee loan repayments to lending institutions
providing financing of industrial or housing projects. This guaranteee may
not exceed eighty per cent of the amount of the loan. To safeguard itself
from losses, it may acquire, manage, or dispose of real or personal property,
or take assignments of rentals or leases. Recipients of the guarantee would
have to demonstrate their inability to obtain credit from conventional sources
without benefit of guarantee fund assistance. (As noted in the earlier discussion or urban financing, conventional loans for these purposes have
always been difficult to obtain.) The Guarantee Fund's capital derives from
private gifts, grants, sale of debentures, and from the loan insurance premiums
paid by the borrowers. The Guarantee Fund can guarantee loans to an
amount not to exceed five times the amount of its capital; it has not yet
obtained the required minimum capital loan guarantee fund of 200,000
dollars, but attainment of that level will thus enable it to start off with
$1 million loan guarantee capacity.
The 1967 bill vetoed by Governor Rockefeller also contained provisions
that have now been incorporated into a separate act to establish a state public
corporation, the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) .126
The governmental corporate form was necessitated by constitutional barriers
to direct receipt of government assistance by a quasi-public body, whether in
the form of legislative appropriation; backing of bonds by the full faith and
credit of the state or locality; or municipal contributions to the corporation

125.
126.

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS, subch. III, §§6341-60 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws, subch. 1, §§6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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through donation of abandoned or vacant properties, or writing down the
value of land in urban renewal areas.
To insure maximum coordination of efforts, both the Guarantee Fund
and UDC utilize the same board of directors as CUDR. UDG further utilizes
the services of community advisory committees. The members of these committees shall be appointed by the board, shall serve at the pleasure of the
board, and shall operate under rules and regulations established by the
board. These committees will hopefully insure citizens a genuine role in the
decisionmaking process and will provide UDG with intimate knowledge of
neighborhood problems and attitudes. However, the membership, specific
means of selection, and the extent to which the committees' advice will be
utilized in decisionmaking are not specified by the legislation. No projects
have yet reached the stage of corporate commitment to warrant establishment
of community advisory committees; hence, these questions remain unanswered.
For additional mortgage financing, UDC is authorized to obtain loans.
These loans could be obtained from the Federal Housing Administration or
from conventional lenders such as banks or insurance companies. The state
provided an initial appropriation of $17 million. Further, the Act permits
issuance of up to $1 billion in self-liquidating bonds. Although not backed
by the state's full faith and credit, the bonds are protected by a legislative
"moral obligation" to maintain a debt service reserve fund at the level necessary to cover outstanding bonds. However, in the absence of a favorable
Internal Revenue Service ruling, no attempt has been made to float bonds.
UDC's housing program would be carried on through subsidiary corporations. The subsidiaries would be entitled to receive exemption from local
taxes. It is anticipated that the housing would eventually come under private
ownership through the sale of stock in these subsidiaries to private investors.
If the tenants of a particular project are able to do so, it would be possible
for them to form a mutual corporation for the purpose of acquiring title
to the property. First priority in sale will go to cooperative tenants' associations and nonprofit neighborhood groups. For financing purposes, full use
will be made of the resources of the New York State Housing Finance
Agency (HFA). The HFA has over $1 billion in available funds and is
authorized to lend UDG or its subsidiaries ninety-five per cent of the costs of
limited-profit rental housing. This would enable $10 million in UDC equity
to produce $200 million of residential construction. At present, these funds
1 27
are not being used for lack of qualified nonprofit housing sponsors.
Industrial projects would be financed by the sale of UDC's own bonds.
These industrial buildings could then be sold or leased to corporate users
who would provide new job opportunities. Industrial plants must receive
exemption from local taxes if business is to be attracted to urban areas.
Industrial and commercial projects are fully exempt from local taxes while
owned by UDC although the tax status of projects conveyed by long-term
leases is not certain. To the greatest extent possible, commercial or indus127. Amdursky, The New York Urban Development Corporation, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J. 100
(1969); see N.Y. Pav. Hous. FIN. LAw 22, 26-b, as amended (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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trial projects will be sold or leased before construction, or immediately upon
the completion of construction. In this fashion, the corporation would have a
binding commitment for disposal at a specified stage. Presently, UDC does
not envision continuing corporate ownership of commercial or industrial
properties for any extended periods of time. It contends such ownership,
with full tax exemption, would constitute an inequitable competition with
private enterprise.
UDC would also be authorized to develop urban renewal areas on a
comprehensive basis by clearing, planning, and then allocating various portions of the area to other developers. Educational, cultural, recreational, or
other community projects would also be a part of UDC's program. It would
have the right, for these and all of its projects, to acquire land in urban areas
by purchase or condemnation.
In its working with construction, manufacturing, and industrial firms,
contractors, and labor unions UDC is expressly required to insure that
residents of areas in which projects are to be located are afforded priority
in the construction work on UDC projects and in the business operations of
8
commercial and industrial projects assisted by the corporation.12
UDC would be able to sell its properties at any time during planning,
construction, or operation, and preferably, at the earliest stage possible. In
this way, private capital would flow in and release UDC's funds for use in
new developments.
The UDC legislation expressly requires, as a condition precedent to
undertaking any project, a finding that "there is a feasible method for the
relocation of families and individuals displaced from the project area into
decent, safe and sanitary dwellings," at rents within their financial means,
and in the same area or in other districts "not generally less desirable."
Where possible, UDC shall offer housing accommodations in corporate residential projects. In addition, it "may render . . . such assistance as it may

deem necessary to enable them to relocate." This latter provision would
appear to authorize UDC to bear all expenses of relocation.
One of the potentially most expansive powers granted UDC is the right
to bypass local zoning regulations and ordinances and to substitute the state
building construction code for local building regulations. Criticism centered
around this power has hampered efforts to obtain cooperation between UDC
and New York City; Mayor Lindsay attacked the corporation as an "invasion"
and "encroachment" on local home-rule powers. 1 29
EVALUATION OF

CUDR

FORM AND OPERATION

In the evaluation of New York's efforts at utilization of the quasi-public
format for urban community development, consideration will be directed
toward a single quasi-public entity, as the 1967 Act envisioned. Constitutional

128.

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §6254(11)

(McKinney Supp. 1968).

129. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1968, at 21, col. 1; cf. Editorial id., Feb. 19, 1969, at 46, col. 2;
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 29, at 25, 143-45.
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doubts had so incapacitated previous New York community development
efforts that it was felt necessary to segregate the quasi-public elements from
direct state assistance..' 0 In 1967 the voters of New York rejected a new
constitution containing a provision that would have authorized a full scale
quasi-public enterprise in state-wide community development, much like
that envisioned in the vetoed 1967 Act.' 3' Constitutional restrictions to the
full application of CUDR/UDC's power have already appeared in commercial and industrial facility construction and in the planning and development
of new cities. In response, the Governor's office is in the process of drafting a
new community development article for inclusion in the New York constitution.S2
If Florida were to adopt the quasi-public mode, it would be undesirable to
model the proposal upon what New York was forced to accept. Amendment
of the Florida constitution, as suggested in the conclusion of this note, would
provide the means to implement this joinder of state and private enterprise.
The Role of Private Enterprise- Application of Tax Incentives?
By using low-rate loans of equity capital, "seed money" grants, and
investment incentives, CUDR/UDC seeks to incorporate the efficiency,
initiative, and resources of private enterprise into the otherwise inefficient
and often exploitative urban redevelopment field. Since the plight of the urban
13
core is in many ways the result of unregulated private economic activity, 3
it may seem anomalous to propose expansion of private, profit-motivated
investment as the vehicle for attacking the problem. But the assumption
underlying the entire quasi-public approach is that the private sector must
be an element of any successful effort to meet urban community requirements
on a scale sufficient to meet rapidly increasing needs. 34 While some might
130. New York repeatedly has encountered problems of constitutional support in attempting to implement community development legislation. The Urban Redevelopment
Corporations Law of 1941 (Pray. Hous. FIN. LAw, art. VI) purported to authorize the use
of tax exemption and eminent domain to encourage private residential and nonresidential
redevelopment. This concept was never implemented as constitutional doubts precluded
the attraction of any private capital. The Community Development Corporations Act of
1963 failed to materialize because of reservations on the part of the state Housing Finance
Agency on the constitutionality of authorized loans. See generally TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HOUSING, LABOR NATURAL REsouRcEs 24-25, 54

(1967) (New York).
131. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the state, its political
subdivisions, and any public corporation may, as provided by law, where a public purpose
will be served, grant or lend its funds to any individual, association, or private corporation
for purposes of participating or assisting in economic and community development." PROPosALs FOR 1969, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS STATE LEGISLATrvE
PROGRAM, reported in 28 COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1969,

E-89 (1968). See generally Kaden, Some Observations on the 1967 New York Constitutional
Convention, The People: No!, 5 HAxv. J. LEGis. 343 (1968).
132. Telephone interview with Robert S. Amdursky, supra note 122. See also N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1969, at 18, col. 3.
133. See State ex rel. Grubstein v. Campbell, 146 Fla. 532, 1 So. 2d 483 (1941).
134. See An Act To Establish a Corporation for Urban Development, 5 HARV. J. LEGIs.
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argue that profit seeking corporations lack the values, interest, and sensitivity
to become useful participants in any urban reform program, 135 the suitability of involving private industry can hardly be debated in the abstract.
The issue is rather, whether a particular plan of incentives has a structure
and system of internal control that would successfully insure that the private
corporations serve publicly defined policy. Once it has been determined that
private industry must be drawn into comprehensive urban community
development, it seems evident that material incentives are far more likely
than exhortations to corporate good citizenship to induce private corporations to undertake the organization and financing necessary to participate
in such a program.
One of the most contemporary of suggestions for enticement of the private
sector into urban community development is the granting of tax benefits,
credits, and incentives for such participation.13 6 CUDR/UDC provides only
for state exemption of corporate properties and earnings of corporate bonds' 1 ,
and tax abatement at the local level through corporate rebates to affected
municipalities. Yet in view of the numerous current proposals for revision
of the Internal Revenue Code to encourage such investment, it is plausable
to evaluate briefly this concept as a probable future addition to the
CUDR/UDC structure.
There are objections in principle to the manipulation of the tax structure, rather than use of direct subsidies, to promote social goals.1 3 Such
objections have formed the bulk of the criticisms of the tax incentive or tax
credit concept. 139 At the most general level, the objection to tax incentives
is that they violate the principle of "horizontal equity" - that taxpayers with
equal incomes be taxed equally, without regard to the source of their
income.140 Adherents of this position warn that acceptance of an incentive
scheme intended to promote one popular objective creates a precedent for
acceptance of incentives for other socially important or politically attractive

529 (1968);

PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL

COMMISSION ON URBAN

PROBLEMS,

REPORT

(1969).

135. See Harrington, The Social-IndustrialComplex, 235 HARPERS MAGAZINE, Nov. 1967,
at 55, But see Editorial, What Business Can Do for the Cities, FORTUNE, Jan. 1968, at 162;
Smith, Creative Federalism and Creative Capitalism, VITAL SPEECHES, Feb. 1, 1966, at 233.
136. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968, §111, at 14, col. 1; id. at 15, col. 3; id., Jan.
27, 1969, at 1, col. 6. But see P. HODGE & P. HAUSER, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION
TO HOUSING 86-103 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems; Research Rep. No. 5, 1968); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1969, at 17, col. 1; id., Feb. 9, 1969, at 39, col. 1.
137. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §6272 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
138. See generally Note, Federal Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 76 HAlv. L. REv.
369, 374 (1963).
139. See Hearings on S. 2100 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
148 (1967). S. 2100 was a proposal of Senator Robert Kennedy to combine long-term
mortgage loans by the Government with tax benefits to induce private investors to build
or substantially rehabilitate low rent housing. For a discussion of the provisions of this
proposal and a step-by-step evaluation of the S. 2100 approach, see Note, Government Programs, supra note 60.
140. See R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160-82 (1959).
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activities, which might result cumulatively in extensive erosion of the tax
base.14'
A second general argument against use of tax incentives refers not to
their effect on the tax base, but to the difficulty of evaluating and controlling
the programs they support. Evaluation of any program requires knowledge
of its costs and benefits. The difficulties in estimation increase when the
cost of the program is paid in foregone revenue rather than by direct
appropriations. 4 2 Furthermore, tax incentives are extremely difficult to
control -through the political process once they are enacted. Since the tax
provisions implementing an incentive plan are usually complex and their cost
hidden in the over-all tax burden, it is hard for policymakers or the general
public to assess their effectiveness. 143 And there is ordinarily no annual budget
review of either the costs of tax incentive programs or the effectiveness of
the response to them. 44
In practice, these general objections have not precluded the use of tax
incentives in the past to stimulate activity thought to be of high national
priority. However, the argument is made that incentives such as the 1954
provisions permitting accelerated depreciation on industrial equipment 4 5
and the 1961 tax credit of seven per cent on investment on manufacturing
equipment 4 6 apply to taxpayers "across the board," and should therefore be
distinguished from incentives for a "narrow or specialized purpose."'147 Characterizing metropolitan community development, housing, or the elimination
of slums as "narrow" purposes hardly seems appropriate. But even were the
point conceded, the critics are disingenuous in ignoring highly specific tax
provisions enacted in the past. Exceptionally rapid amortization has been
provided for atomic research and development 4 and grain storage facili141.

See Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform

-Twenty

Questions, 41 TAXES 672 (1963);

Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1957). See generally
JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., FLscAL PoLIcY IssuEs OF THE COMING DECADE
(Comm. Print 1965); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax

Reform, 80 HARV.L. R-v. 925 (1967).
142.

See Note, Government Programs, supra note 60, at 1313-17. See generally Blum,

How the Growth of Favored Tax Treatment Affects Taxpayers and Practitioners,4 J. TAXATION 28 (1956).
143. The relatively low political visibility of tax incentive devices may have advantages
as well as disadvantages in the low-income housing and community development: direct
subsidies, unlike revenue losses, would be visible charges to the annual budget and would
require raising budget limits or cutting back existing programs. Cf. Cahn & Cahn, The
New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HAv. L. REv. 929 (1968).

144. But see Kraus, The Tax Incentive, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1967, at 65, col. 6, suggesting that an annual submission to Congress of a companion budget showing the estimated
costs in lost revenue due to existing tax preferences and the estimated levels of response to
them, would subject these programs to the same scrutiny presently received by programs
involving direct outlays.
145. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §167 (b). See Brown, The New Depreciation Policy Under
the Income Tax: An Economic Analysis, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 81 (1955).
146. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§38, 46-48. See generally Wilkinson, The Investment Tax
Credit Under the Revenue Act of 1962, 42 TEXAs L. R-v. 498 (1964).
147. Hearings,supra note 139, at 148.

148. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §168 (3)
(2).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

ties.149 Favorable tax treatment has been accorded the exploitation of
mineral resources, 150 employee stock options, 151 and Western Hemisphere
trade corporations.52 Existing inequities in the Internal Revenue Code
certainly present no persuasive argument for expansion of tax preferences.153
However, unless current tax reform proposals impose uniformity on the Code,
advocates of application of tax credits to metropolitan development cannot
be criticized very severely for sharing in the general tendency to look to tax
relief as an appropriate means of pursuing specific policy objectives.
Citizen Participation: Vehicle for "Black Capitalism"
Current discussions of urban problems,15 4 as well as recent legislation, 55
emphasize that it may not be possible to serve social goals intelligently and
sensitively through centralized administration. The debate on urban policy
has gone beyond technology and economics; the most controversial issues
center around the extent to which the poor themselves should participate in
the planning and administration of programs designed for their benefit, and
the mechanisms by which this participation should be achieved.
The CUDR/UDC provisions provide no effective guarantee that the poor
will participate in planning the type or location of projects. The community
advisory committee provisions do not necessarily fulfill this function. Although the UDC Act requires establishment of the committees, their composition, selection, and role are left to the determination of the board. The 1967
bill would have provided strong assurances of participation, but the drafters
of the current act preferred to leave the language broad and indefinite.
Further, in view of the tendency of government officials to appoint persons
of their own choosing, allegedly possessing ghetto "leadership," 15 6 selection

149. Id. at § 169.
150. Id. at §§611-17.
151. Id. at §§421 (a), 422, 423.
152. Id. at §922 (taxable income reduced).
153. See Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1441, 1456-58 (1960).
154. See Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation: A Suburban Suggestion for the
Central City, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 220 (1967); Snowden & Snowden, Citizen Participation, 20 J. HOUSING 132 (1963); Note, Citizen Participationin Urban Renewal, 66 COLUMI.
L. REV. 485 (1966).
155. See Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C.
§3303 (a) (Supp. III, 1968) ("widespread citizen participation"); Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2782 (a) (8) (1964) ("maximum feasible participation of residents");
ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., STRATEGIES FOR SHAPING MODEL CITIES (1967); Note, Participation
of the Poor: Section 202 (a) (3) Organizations Under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
75 YALE L.J. 599 (1966). See generally MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING:
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY

(1969).

156. As noted by Daniel Watts, the editor of Liberator, "The Negro preacher has been
the self-appointed leader of the community and the white power structure of the city would
like to deal with him. But this does not get through to the 'soul brothers' who could get

the idea to burn the community down." Chicago Daily News, June 7, 1967, at 9, col. 1,
quoted in Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 154, at 221.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss5/4

28

Schwenke: The Quasi-Public Corporation and Constitutional Revision--Formula

1969]

THE QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION

should have been left to the residents of the project area. Analagous provisions
for appointment of special directors have been characterized as "a sop to the
poor."' 5 7 Real citizen participation requires delegation of governing power
to the neighborhood level.
Although the CUDR membership council and certificate purchase provisions theoretically could provide a vehicle for participation, the 500 dollar
cost per certificate effectively excludes the poor from the operation of the
council. Even without this obstacle, motivating poor men to invest rather
than to spend their money on immediate needs represents a considerable
obstacle, to be overcome only if a high level of enthusiasm for ownership
5
could be generated among residents.
Even if certificate ownership were widespread among the poor, the idea
of participation would not be fulfilled unless the holders also participated
actively in council and corporate voting. The CUDR Act permits proxies, but
says nothing of the necessary corollary of proxy solicitation. Further, the
CUDR Act also is silent on cumulative voting, the traditional corporate
procedure for securing minority representation.
An alternative forum for participation is available through the corporation's power to create subsidiary corporations. Yet the structure of these
subsidiaries does not sufficiently insure an opportunity for participation.
Similar problems of share acquisition and shareholder participation would
burden the subsidiary; at least, here the CUDR/UDC Acts say nothing of
costs per share, so the poor need not be priced out of competition as they
were with the 500 dollar certificates. Currently, despite authority for creation
of subsidiaries for multiple purposes, the corporation has indicated an intent
to limit the subsidiary form to housing corporations. 159 Furthermore, the
CUDR/UDC board, not the residents of the affected area, designates a
majority of directors or trustees of the subsidiary, or possesses more than fifty
per cent of the voting shares of the subsidiary. The board of directors of the
subsidiary should be chosen by resident shareholders. Shareholders should
participate at the director level, since their concerns with their own employment probably would preclude a more active role. Finally, participation at
the director level puts the low-income shareholder in the unusual position of
employer; as such, he has meaningful control over the development of his
community.
With such modification, coupled with authorization for operation of the
subsidiaries as profitmaking enterprises, 160 these forms might provide a basis

157. An Act To Establish a Corporation for Urban Development, supra note 134 at
532 n.20.

158. In a recent interview, Mr. Saul Alinsky contended that such motivation is impossible without previous organization of the poor. Only such organization could overcome the distrust engendered by long series of disillusioning experiences with past poverty
programs. He remarked that: "if the poor were given shares of stock, probably most would
lose the certificates." Note, Community Development Corporations: A New Approach to the
Poverty Problem, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 644, 649 n.29 (1969).
159. Telephone interview with Robert S. Amdursky, supra note 122.

160. For consideration of factors relevant to choice between nonprofit and profit forms,
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for the operation of "black capitalism" within the state. The subsidiary could
then own and manage any business within its territory. It would operate as
a typical incorporated business, with two exceptions: stockholders could
acquire shares either for cash or by providing services but would have only
one vote in the enterprise no matter how many shares they owned; and profits
would be used to buy other enterprises and to finance social services and
educational activities within the community. If an expansive network of
federal and state tax incentives were implemented, companies might be
granted incentives, credits, and write-offs if they agreed to establish industries
and then turn them over to the subsidiary corporations when they were in
working order, especially in terms of development of managerial talent to
operate the enterprises. 16'
PROPOSED AMENDMENT

To

THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

The urban renewal and public housing cases developed rigorous tests
for determination of public use and public benefit. These tests, when considered with the narrow limits for approval of joint enterprises with the private
sector resulting from the long series of industrial bond cases, 16 2 indicate that
it is unlikely that the quasi-public form of metropolitan community development could be constitutionally implemented in Florida. The provisions of
the 1885 constitution that preclude such a state enterprise were noted in
Adams v. Housing Authority.163 The 1968 constitution has neither abolished

nor modified any of these barriers; the prohibition of article III, section
11 (a) (10), prohibiting special laws pertaining to disposal of public property
for private purposes, may impose even more obstacles than did the 1885
constitution. Although a method for financing of industrial bonds, where
they are payable solely from revenue derived from the sale, operation, or
leasing of the projects, is now authorized,164 public support of joint publicprivate enterprises in community development is not sanctioned by this
addition. Thus, to accomplish metropolitan community development through
use of a quasi-public form, the Florida constitution will need to be amended.
Beyond these state requirements, Florida and its localities have always
been subject to a federal "public purpose" requirement in the disposition
see An Act To Establish a Corporation for Urban Development, supra note 134, at 531-32.
See also Lesher, supra note 114.
161. See the Community Self-Determination Act of 1969, H.R. 6738, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969); S. 33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Note, supra note 158. See also 114 CoNg. REC.
H7011 (daily ed. July 18, 1968) (remarks of Rep. Goodell); Cherry, The Maverick Creature:

Community Corporation,43 FLA. B.J. 263 (1969).
162.

See, e.g., Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957); Gate City Garage, Inc.

v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1952). See generally Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine, 21 U. MIAmi L. Rev. 171 (1966).
163. See note 70 supra. Fla. S.J. Res. 301 and Fla. H.R. 515 were prefiled before the
1969 session of the Florida Legislature to amend FLA. CONSr. art. 7, §10 (1968) to authorize
"joint investment of public and private funds in corporations whose objective is urban redevelopment and the elimination of slums and blight."
164. FLA. CONST. art. 7, §10(c) (1968).
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of public funds or property and in the utilization of eminent domain. However, this federal test imposes no significant restriction on state action; it
prevents only the "plain case of departure from every public purpose which
could reasonably be conceived. . ."165 All that is necessary to insure that
constitutionality of a particular expenditure is a legislative finding of public
purpose confirmed by the state's highest court. The United States Supreme
Court has frankly admitted that "subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive."1 6 6 It is not surprising that no state decision on

"public purpose" has ever been overruled by the Supreme Court.
The 1968 Florida constitution should be amended to include a community development article that is both flexible and fiscally responsible. The
following formulation, which presupposes some general restrictions on grants
and loans, may serve as an analytical starting point: 167
Section 1. The legislature may provide in such manner and upon such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe for community development,
including the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation and
improvement of residential, industrial, manufacturing, commercial, civic,
cultural, recreational, transportation, communication, educational, health,
mental health, environmental health, or other community structures in
any area or areas of the state; and for all capital facilities, improvements,
land acquisition, securities, and obligations incidental or appurtenant
thereto.
Section 2. Notwithstanding any provision in any other article of this
constitution, the legislature may provide by law for the contracting of
indebtedness, use of public credit, loans, grants, or subsidies payable
only with moneys appropriated from the general or other fund available
for current expenses of the state of local governments, levy of taxes,
exercise of the power of eminent domain, establishment and administration of public and quasi-public corporations, and the granting of the
exemptions and abatements in whole or in part, or any combination
thereof, for or in aid of any of the purposes of this article.
This article focuses, not on housing or slum clearance as separate,
disparate functions of government, but on development of the urban community as a whole. It authorizes comprehensive, multi-purpose programs in
which the state or local governments may redevelop simultaneously residential, industrial, commercial, and recreational facilities in economically depressed core areas or in the suburban fringes. In sum, the article provides
the state and localities with broad flexibility to implement contemporary and
165. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937).
166. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
167. This article is derived from the Republican minority proposal to the Committee
on Health, Housing and Social Services at the 1967 New York State Constitutional Convention, cited in Amdursky, The Urban Crisis and the Need for State Constitutional Revision, 41 STATE GovERNmENT 157, 162 (1968). The recently proposed community development amendment to the New York Constitution, supra note 131, parallels this form rather
than the simplified Convention proposal. However, the Convention proposal could be
used as an alternative amendment to the Florida constitution. See also TEMPoRARY COMMIssION, supra note 130, at 59-62.
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emerging concepts of community development, such as the quasi-public
format.
Equally important, this article permits full cooperation between the
public and private sectors in carrying out the programs. Subject to other
interposed limitations, the state and local governments are authorized to
use grants, long-term, low-interest loans, guarantees, tax abatements and
exemptions, and the power of eminent domain to induce private enterprise
to participate. Through the judicious use of this arsenal of incentives, substantial private investment in community development should be generated
at minimum cost to the taxpayer. Application of this article might have
the further benefit of forcing reexamination and revision of the state tax
structure, including consideration of a general income tax, to insure the
availability of sufficient resources to subsidize the state's contribution to
the corporation.
Despite the breadth of the article, it contains certain limitations designed
to promote fiscal responsibility by the legislature. Thus, grants and subsidies
to private entities may be made only from current revenues. This restriction
on the source of the grants should prove an effective deterrent to imprudent
spending; the state or local government can make the grant only if tax
moneys are available. Moreover, the structures financed with long-term, lowinterest loans will constitute continuing security for the repayment of the debt.
Implementation of such an amendment would enable the state to respond
to the challenge alluded to by Justice Terrell in his opinion in the first
168
Grubstein case:
The man in the slums is too often a victim of the social and economic
system that private enterprise has fostered. When he gets hungry and
sees his dependents going without the dire necessities because of the
system in which he is entrapped, he easily becomes a fertile source to
generate crime and the political isms adverse to democracy. Hurrahs
for justice and equality become empty cymbals when those on one
block are bathing in luxury and those on the next block are cramped
by destitution. To contend that democratic society cannot relieve
against the evils of its own creation is to admit that it has become lost
in anachronisms and can't respond to the demands made on it.
ROGER

168.

D.

SCHWENKE

State ex rel. Grubstein v. Campbell, 146 Fla. 532, 536 1 So. 2d 483, 484 (1941).
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